In order to explore the formation of partisan preferences, this paper develops a political-economic model of the US providing micro-foundations for both the genesis and consequences of unemployment. It predicts the standard findings (1) that Democratic administrations are associated with higher economic growth than are Republican administrations; and (2) that the electorate's partisan preference is influenced by the relative likelihood of unemployment. These two patterns and the link between them are explained in terms of the decisions of rational agents facing uncertain elections and competitive labor markets. Specifically, differences in the parties' fiscal policies affect individuals' employment decisions. Agents use labor contracts to exploit the resulting economic uncertainty. The partisan preferences of the electorate are then influenced by employment status. This explanation avoids certain limitations in the work of Hibbs and Alesina.
Although the association between economic conditions and political outcomes has been amply documented (e.g. Lewis-Beck, 1988) , the literature is far less clear about the mechanism linking the two. In one influential set of politicaleconomic models, for example, voter preferences are exogenous (e.g. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) , with the result that, for all practical purposes, these 'models have no economic agents' (Freeman and Houser, 1998: 633) . An alternative approach does connect economic and political interests, yet only by positing a very direct correlation between them. Thus in a common formulation each voter's preference over tax rates is determined by a direct comparison of per capita and exogenous personal wealth or income-producing ability (e.g. Foley, 1967; Romer, 1975) . A more sociological version of the same idea assigns political preferences to individuals based on their class membership alone. In the case of workers, the upshot is that union organization or union density, rather than individually formed preferences, becomes the crucial factor determining how and whether economic influences are translated into political demands (e.g. Wallerstein, 1989; Alvarez et al., 1991) .
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To have a genuine political-economic theory of partisan preferences, one ultimately needs to know how the political context affects the economic circumstances individuals face, how individuals react to these circumstances, and how these circumstances interact with choices made in the voting booth. So long as individual voters are not viewed as passive transmitters of economic inputs, one needs to understand the mechanism generating the connection between economic circumstances and politics documented in the literature.
With such considerations in mind, this paper develops a model of the US political economy focusing on the government's role in stimulating employment, an issue with enormous resonance in US political debates. The goal is to provide insight into the link between two important features of the US political economy -partisan influences on economic growth and economic influences on votingby focusing on the micro-level decisions generating them. Specifically, we know that Democratic administrations are historically associated with higher economic growth and lower unemployment than are Republican administrations (Hibbs, 1987; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) . Voting preferences, in turn, are influenced by the voter's relative likelihood of unemployment (Hibbs, 1987 ). Yet while this overall empirical pattern connecting party, economic growth, and partisan preference is reasonably clear, the political-economic analysis of this phenomenon is far from settled. Can government actually stimulate job growth and if so by what means? Can a political party, in particular, move the economy in the direction favored by its partisans and thereby influence its own electoral prospects? I address these questions by providing microfoundations for both the politicaleconomic genesis and political-economic consequences of unemployment. The paper thus derives the difference in party economic performance from the way individual employment decisions adapt to the parties' economic policies. Individual partisan preferences are then derived as rational responses to employment status. Hibbs's (1987) Partisan Theory (PT) is perhaps the seminal attempt to understand the political economy of jobs and parties. Unemployment and partisan preference are linked according to PT because those voters who are most likely to be unemployed will favor the party most likely to reduce unemployment. As critics have noted, however, PT relies on the controversial Keynesian view that governments can freely select from alternative combinations of inflation and unemployment. Aside from empirical qualms about this assumption, orthodox Keynesianism has also been contested because of its failure to explain the effectiveness of policy at a basic level, the decisions made by individual workers trying to do the best they can under changing economic conditions. The workers modeled by PT, in particular, respond rationally in the political arena but irrationally in the economic arena where presumably the perceived stakes are greatest.
As its name suggests, the Rational Partisan Theory (RPT) advanced by Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) attempts to address this defi-ciency (see also Chappell and Keech, 1988) . In the US, according to RPT, partisan differences in economic performance are simply a byproduct of uncertain electoral contests between presidential contenders who have different preferences regarding the short-term tradeoff between economic growth and inflation. RPT, we shall see, thereby challenges the simplicity of PT's hypothesized link between party and unemployment by suggesting that policy per se does not directly affect economic growth when agents are fully rational.
Yet RPT has limitations as well. Internally, as already noted, it does not link economic policy to partisan voting preferences. Moreover, it is not clear that the labor contracts central to RPT are consistent with the dynamic of presidential contests that makes these contracts so important. Externally, neither the rationale for these contracts nor the empirical evidence for their economic impact is completely persuasive.
In comparison to RPT, this paper does not trace the primary impact of economic policy to the inability of agents either to predict the winner of the election or to respond optimally to the winner's policy. Instead, the paper reflects the alternative view that economic policy affects growth by influencing individual decisions about work and leisure. Furthermore, the paper does not take the existence of labor contracts for granted. It shows that it is rational for individuals who are buffeted by volatile economic policy to enter into these contracts. Most important from our standpoint, once these arrangements exist, something akin to a class-based division in partisan preferences is generated endogenously, based on individual probabilities of unemployment and the level of unemployment insurance the government provides. Unemployment becomes both a source and a partial product of government policy, a result very much in the spirit of PT. In short, by combining a competitive equilibrium model of the economy and a partisan theory of elections with rational voters, this paper replicates the key political-economic facts driving PT and RPT, but does so in terms of the specific decision problems faced by individuals who work, rest, and vote.
In empirical terms, this paper addresses three key political-economic patterns. One, Democratic administrations are associated with higher growth and lower unemployment than are Republican administrations. Two, Democrats are more likely to receive support from those most likely to be unemployed. Three, this 'natural' Democratic constituency is nonetheless more ideologically conservative than the party in the sense that, given a more extreme 'tax and spend' policy by Democrats, it will switch its partisan allegiance. As Nagler and De Boef (1999) observe, any account of class voting must confront the paradox that the bluecollar workers who rewarded Republican presidential candidates in the 1980s seemed to vote counter to their individually declining economic position. More broadly, the paper replicates Weatherford's (1978) finding that these workers are the key source of the macro-level link between economic conditions and political outcomes, and indeed that they are more likely to change their political allegiance.
Politics Seen Through Contract Lenses
One way economic policy may affect a nation's output is through the government's influence on monetary aggregates. According to RPT, workers cannot react to unexpected changes in the money supply because they are bound by labor contracts setting their nominal wage. Accordingly, an unanticipated increase in the money supply lowers the real cost of labor, which stimulates employment and output, while a decrease has the opposite effect. The monetary surprises of interest to the theory are political in origin. While each contract incorporates rational expectations concerning future money growth, it cannot fully anticipate the outcome of presidential elections involving two candidates with clear differences in their growth targets and therefore clear differences in their monetary targets. RPT implies that Democratic policies stimulate the economy only because they produce a money supply exceeding the rational preelection forecasts incorporated in nominally rigid labor contracts; Republican policies have the opposite effect only because they produce a lower than expected money supply. Since the resulting divergence reflects uncertainty as much as the policies themselves, in this sense Democrats and Republicans depend on one another for their own effectiveness. Once the identity of the president is known, on the other hand, economic agents can negate either policy extreme when rewriting their contracts. Thus, RPT predicts, the second half of Democratic and Republican administrations will be economically similar.
But there are difficulties with this analysis. For example, while election outcomes may be unpredictable, elections are not, having occurred biennially for over 200 years. If economic agents find it rational to rewrite contracts in order to realign their real wage expectations with policy, why do they not achieve the same effect for the first half of the administration by making their contracts contingent on electoral outcomes (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989: 608) ? It is odd that fluctuations in monetary policy are the centerpiece of RPT's account of the business cycle, yet agents in this model fail to give them full recognition.
1 Empirically, if nominal wage contracts accounted for the impact of changes in monetary policy, real wages should be countercyclical, which according to Keane (1993) they have not been, even in the severe recession of 1982 (Abraham and Haltiwanger [1995: 1262] , who ultimately concur, offer a survey of empirical 1. Testing RPT, Hibbs et al. (1997) partly meet this objection by formally recognizing that contracts renewed after an election can correct for pre-election contractual mistakes. Incorporating this correction substantially improves model fit. Citing Gray (1976) , Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) argue that optimal contracts will not be fully indexed against inflation surprises. But these partially indexed contracts are only optimal given the particular rules of output determination assumed in the analysis (Barro, 1977; also Gordon, 1990 also Gordon, : 1139 . As intuition might suggest, when economic agents rely on purely nominal indexing to accommodate real as well as nominal shocks, they leave further gains from trade unexploited.
findings; for other problems with contract explanations, see Mankiw [1990 Mankiw [ : 1656 and Chari et al. [1996] ). Lucas (1981: 226) concludes, 'any attempt to assign systematic real wage movements a central role in the explanation of business cycles is doomed to failure' (but see also Taylor, 1998) .
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Using monetary policy to drive the model is not entirely unproblematic either. There are questions about the money-output relation (e.g. Friedman and Kuttner, 1992) ; the president's influence on a formally independent central bank (e.g. Beck, 1987; Chappell et al., 1993; Keech and Morris, 1997) ; the direction of causation between money and output (e.g. King and Plosser, 1984; Gavin and Kydland, 1995) ; and the importance of monetary surprises (e.g. Sims and Zha, 1998) . Alesina et al. (1997) and Hibbs et al. (1997) do find that 'partisan surprise' affects growth in the appropriate fashion, but partisan surprise is not equivalent to monetary surprise, a distinction explored later. Finally, in a careful analysis Faust and Irons (1999) find little empirical support for the claim that partisan differences in monetary policy account for partisan patterns in economic growth.
Perhaps it would be prudent, then, to consider whether political-economic models without rationally unmotivated deviations from competitive equilibria can nonetheless sustain the standard conclusions about political-economic dynamics. The remainder of this paper explores this issue by imposing fewer institutional rigidities on the economy than do PT or RPT. True, no other political-economic approach -and certainly not the competitive equilibrium formulation adopted later -can claim consensus support. But this formulation can be used to develop a model equilibrium political economy derived from optimal individual behavior. Such a model serves as a benchmark for assessing whether certain empirical political-economic patterns are intrinsically foreign to it, so that additional institutional assumptions or non-rational individual behavior must be part of their explanation. Implicit and explicit labor contracts, for example, are a prominent feature of modern economies. I will show how these arise endogenously and interact with electoral processes. More generally, by focusing on the politically salient issue of employment, the model can be used to address some distinctly political questions, in particular, the determination of political preferences among workers.
2. New Keynesians often look to rigidities in goods markets for the source of policy effects. Indeed Alesina and Rosenthal (1995: 185-6 ) cite Mankiw's (1985) argument that even the small costs of changing a firm's prices (or its 'menu') can have large real aggregate effects. Independent of important but generic criticisms of this approach (e.g. Gordon, 1990 : 1145-7) -some parallel to the critique of the labor contract account (e.g. Chari et al., 1996) -it is unclear whether electoral uncertainty plays any immediate and essential role in a menu-cost model, since even anticipated price changes will be foregone when the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. Firms establishing their normal price-changing schedule face the same issues about incorporating the electoral cycle raised earlier.
An Economy with Indivisible Labor
The first step is to describe a competitive economy, that is, one in which each individual has a negligible impact on the whole. To do this I assume there is a continuum of laboring consumers i, i ∈ [0, 1], each seeking to maximize at time t = 0 the expected value of (1) where β ∈ (0, 1) is the temporal discount factor; c it is i's consumption at time t; n it is the amount of labor i supplies at time t, so 1 -n it is that period's leisure when total time available per period is normalized to unity; u(c it , 1 -n it ) is the uniform period utility function; G t is aggregate government spending at time t; and φ is an increasing concave function reflecting ideological reactions to government spending distinct from its impact on the marginal utility of either private consumption or leisure (see footnote 4, p. 331 for elaboration). Since φ is agentspecific, it generates ex ante partisan diversity in the electorate and, as we will see, 'centralizes' the typical voter between the parties. A natural example, for most citizens, is spending on national defense. Because I assume that the utility of current agents is linked to that of future generations via an altruistic bequest motive, however attenuated by β t , equation 1 is calculated to infinity (see, e.g., Barro, 1974 and, for empirical support, Seater, 1993 . Although practicable, a two-period model à la Alesina would have to assume that, like the political world, the economic world starts over with every administration, since the present approach addresses the coordination of individual decision-making in the two arenas.
The period utility function (each period equals 4 years) is characterized by intratemporal dependence between consumption and leisure:
where ρ is the relative weight given to leisure. Here and elsewhere, agentspecific subscripts are omitted when there is no ambiguity.
There is a single profit-maximizing firm with access to a constant-returns-toscale production technology, which implies that the firm behaves as though the 3. This and a related function are the only ones capable of satisfying two conditions dictated by theoretical and empirical considerations (see King et al., 1988: 201-2) : intertemporal elasticity must be invariant to the scale of consumption and hours worked cannot grow when the economy is in its steady state.
market were competitive. Government and private consumption cannot exceed its production possibilities, which are given by (3) with K t , N t *, and C t , denoting aggregate capital, labor, and private consumption respectively and λ t a technological source of increases in the productivity of labor. Given this known productivity trend, which is assumed to have a finite upper bound, the growth in government characterized later need not make G t arbitrarily large relative to the economy as a whole. With that role understood, the analysis will proceed largely in terms of 'effective labor' N t ≡ λ t N t * incorporating the trend. Three things affect individual economic well-being and therefore determine labor-leisure choices: the after-tax wage, the after-tax return from capital, and government consumption. Specifically, the individual budget constraint is given by
where w t , the wage rate, here equals the marginal product of labor; k t is the amount of privately owned capital which the firm rents from the individual agent; r t is the rate of return on capital, which here equals its marginal product; I t is unemployment insurance net of any insurance premium; g t is government's net transfer to the individual, not counting unemployment insurance; and τ t , 0 < τ t < 1, is a uniform tax on labor and capital income. By assumption, the government budget is balanced each period:
where tr t is a lump-sum individual transfer needed to balance the budget in the present value sense. 4 Moreover, each individual is assumed to be endowed with one unit of capital (k it = 1, ∀i, t). For the utility function (1), the constraint on c t is binding and thus can be replaced in (2) by (1 -τ t )(n t w t + r t ) + I t + g t . Net consumption for the unemployed is assumed to be positive even in the absence of unemployment insurance: (1 -τ t )r t + g t > 0.
As previously noted, there is a large literature (e.g. Foley, 1967; Romer, 1975; Snyder and Kramer, 1988; Meltzer et al., 1991; Krusell and Ríos-Rull, 1999) examining how an exogenously determined diversity of wealth or incomeproducing ability affects voters' preferences for tax rates. While the general message of this literature is clear -those more (respectively less) highly endowed than the median voter prefer relatively lower (respectively higher) rates -much of this analysis focuses on finding political equilibria given the resulting preference functions. By contrast, the present model assumes workers are equally productive and holds capital constant across individuals (and over time, in this respect paralleling the static models just cited). By way of compensation, political differences and the economic differences generating them are now endogenous. Specifically, I am able to focus on the emergence of unemployment and its role as a salient political issue. In a still more methodological vein, by effectively eliminating borrowing between periods and capital depreciation I avoid additional complications in solving the model that is described later.
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Although government spending can add to private consumption, I suppose that for the time period under consideration the net impact of increases in government spending on individual consumption is weakly negative at the margin, i.e., dg t /dG t ≤ 0. Several considerations motivate this assumption. First, the positive impact of government spending on individual consumption is attenuated to the extent purchases such as defense do not alter the productivity of private consumption or private capital (e.g. Kormendi, 1983; Baxter and King, 1993) . Second, insofar as government spending does substitute for private spending, Barro (1989: 183, 190-1) , Kormendi (1983) and others argue, it is apt to do so imperfectly since government spending will increase until, due to changing marginal rates of substitution, it is a less than perfect substitute. Third, spending increases must be financed. One way is through higher taxes on labor or capital income. The additional government revenue can also be financed as a deficit. But in the present model deficits represent a reduction in individual wealth because current taxpayers treat the present value of any increase in their debt obligations, or those of their descendants, as a current loss (see Seater, 1993 , for an empirical and theoretical survey of this claim). Increased deficits here correspond to an increase in lump-sum taxes, an analytically tractable formulation that has proven to be quite useful empirically (e.g. Aiyagari et al., 1992) . Although inaccurate, this formulation captures in the simplest fashion the impact of deficits on the representative individual, who puts aside wealth in expectation of having to pay for the debt 5. Danthine and Donaldson (1995: 220) outline the empirical justification for these stipulations: in the US workers' principal form of wealth is their human capital, which does not serve as collateral for loans, and a substantial portion of the population does not own stocks. This helps legitimate the assumption of a uniform effective tax rate on capital and labor income insofar as income from human capital is taxed as labor income. Of course, neither of these empirical considerations nor the assumption of equal ownership of capital reflects the substantial heterogeneity of the actual US population.
in some way and therefore experiences a net reduction in consumption when government spending increases. This result is consistent with McGrattan's (1994) finding that positive shocks to government spending have a negative impact on per capita utility.
As for the amount of labor each individual contributes, minimum commuting times are necessary for work to begin and each member of a household must make a discrete decision to enter the market.
6 Due to these restrictions, there is an indivisibility in individual labor supply. To adopt the usual formulation, each individual is characterized as facing the choice of working some fixed number of hours n 0 or none at all: n ∈ {0, n 0 }. Although it would be more realistic to allow workers to adjust their hours along the intensive as well as extensive margin, in the US changes in hours worked do, in fact, primarily reflect changes in employment status rather than changes in hours per worker (Hansen, 1985: 310) .
As shown later, these indivisibilities allow for the possibility of unemployment even in an economy in which all agents are ex ante identical. This result not only represents a major gain in realism concerning the labor market but introduces a distinction with important political consequences: economic heterogeneity leads to political heterogeneity. Because agents can wind up with different allocations by virtue of being employed or unemployed, however, the computation of the political economy's equilibria may have no direct recourse to a representative agent. This poses particular difficulties in dynamic settings because heterogeneous agents must calculate the aggregate and individual consequences of alternative future distributions of employment and consumption. The resulting complications suggest the restrictions on capital and borrowing adopted here. As we will see, these restrictions permit transparent analytic solutions; otherwise, numerical approximation techniques are required.
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Following Alesina (1987) , government spending is a random variable , j ∈ {D, R}, taking the value when a Democrat holds the presidency and the value < when a Republican holds it. Note in connection with the earlier discussion about government spending and taxation that 'Democrats might be more eager to spend more, but are also more eager to increase revenues' (Alesina et al., 1997: 105) , a perception shared by voters (Baumer and Gold, 1995) . Likewise note that partisan distinctions regarding spending incorporate the 6. Hansen (1985) introduces this assumption in order to reconcile (i) the implied willingness of workers within standard dynamic equilibrium models to engage in substantial intertemporal substitution between current and future leisure, with (ii) empirical evidence of considerably less individual elasticity. The implication of this refinement is that a small individual elasticity of substitution is consistent with high aggregate variability.
7. Ríos-Rull (1995) offers a more complete discussion of the consequences of heterogeneity. Since models with the additional heterogeneity avoided here do not provide clear analytic characterizations of the behavior of agents, any further explanation of individual political preferences becomes more complicated. By the same token, it is often difficult to rely on the empirical estimates produced through numerical techniques (Geweke, 1999) . is due to variation in turnout from the same continuum of agents populating the labor market. This continuum, we shall see, divides into two subsets each period, one of measure N t */n 0 consisting of those who work and another of measure 1 -N t */n 0 consisting of those who do not (due to the unit size of the population, N t */n 0 is both the number employed and the fraction of labor employed). As in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) , decisions to vote will be influenced by personal circumstances such as local weather, illness, and sense of civic duty. Recall that φ i (G t ) is agent-specific, so to the extent these factors are uncorrelated with employment status, the economic profile of political participants will be uncertain. Thus conditions influencing the turnout decision generate aggregate uncertainty about the economic profile of voters.
9 Since the set of voters is still of positive measure, each voter is entitled to take as exogenous.
For the period under consideration, I suppose E t > E t = λ 1 -α G t so that the gross rate of expected government growth under Democrats is above trend economic growth and at trend under Republicans.
10 At the individual level, the expectation is < = g t ≥ 0. Obviously, this pattern cannot be sustained in the long run, for if Democrats win some proportion of elections government would become an arbitrarily large part of the economy. In the long run, 8. In the 1976 vice-presidential debate, Robert Dole offered a notoriously unsubtle interpretation of the historical association (through the Clinton presidency) between Democratic presidents and 20th-century wars, war constituting the largest positive shock to government spending. The text, in any case, equates fiscal policy with the president's ideal. Policy is more accurately treated as a weighted average of the legislature's and president's preferences (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) . However, so long as there are policy differences between Democratic and Republican administrations, which is generally true in Alesina and Rosenthal's model, the analysis in the text holds. Much of it is also valid, of course, if policy differences are more administration-specific (see Beck, 1982) . Finally, it is interesting to observe that the so-called Solow residual used to measure productivity shocks is associated with the political party of the president (Hall, 1988) . Here I have assumed λ t is deterministic and exogenous.
9. Specifically, suppose potential voters are drawn from the interval [0, 1], the first N/λ t n 0 of whom are employed and the remaining 1 -N/λ t n 0 of whom are not. Let z i be a random variable distributed on the unit interval such that for each i ∈ [0, 1], i votes if i + z i -1 ≤ Z and abstains if i + z i -1 > Z, 0 < Z < 1. The voting status of the members of the two groups is therefore random.
For simplicity I assume that z i is uniformly distributed; by sidestepping the problem of reconciling turnout rates of the various components of the 'unemployed' group as defined here -traditional unemployed, nonworking spouses, college students, retirees capable of working -I also simplify the Democratic political calculations developed later.
10. E t denotes mathematical expectation conditioned on information available at time t. Technically, I assume that with the exception of turnout all random variables reflect first-order Markov processes of the form x t + 1 = δx t + ε t , with ε t white noise. Turnout, by contrast, reflects a random variable that is independent and identically distributed.
then, it is more reasonable to equate the trend growth rate of government consumption with the trend growth rate of the economy. However, the ratcheting pattern is broadly consistent with secular changes in the G/GNP ratio since the Second World War (e.g. Baxter and King, 1993) .
Democratic and Republican policies on unemployment insurance exhibit an analogous difference with respect to expected benefits, so that for the unemployed I t
Parties, of course, do not offer competing unemployment insurance policies every election, but alternative welfare packages can have the same result (see Wright, 1986: 397) . The administration of benefits has historically been left to the individual states, and virtually all states distinguish between those who quit and those who are fired (e.g. Clark and Summers, 1982: 293) . Accordingly, I assume that insurance in each period depends on preceding employment status. Also reflecting actual practice, this insurance is assumed to be funded internally by workers, either directly as premiums or indirectly through the firm which pays a commensurately lower wage. In either case, the firm, in unemployment insurance parlance, is fully experience-rated and the cost of insurance is fully shifted: employed workers pay (1 -N t */n 0 )I t u = -(N t */n 0 )I t e , where the superscripts u and e denote employment and unemployment respectively and I t e ≤ 0 ≤ I t u . Thus ∫I t u di + ∫I t e dj = 0, where integration is over the unemployed i and employed j respectively.
I now develop two main results initially assuming there is no insurance. First, the equilibrium of the model economy can include a mix of employed and unemployed individuals notwithstanding their being otherwise identical for economic purposes (see Rogerson, 1988) . Second, an increase in government spending increases employment. In turn, increased employment increases output. In the next section, I show that this economic variation motivates labor contracts that take advantage of the availability of government unemployment insurance. As a result, partisan differences in the electorate emerge.
A competitive equilibrium for the economy described earlier establishes for each period a feasible allocation of labor, consumption, and capital such that: (1) each individual i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes utility subject to his or her budget; (2) the firm employs labor and capital to maximize profit, the difference between production and factor payments; and (3) the firm uses the available amounts of labor and capital, and therefore the entire product is consumed (in short, the market clears, and the government budget is balanced in the present value sense):
where time subscripts have been suppressed. Since all capital is used, K = 1.
A new period begins following the election of a president. With this sequence in mind, each agent chooses n ∈ {0, n 0 } to solve the following stochastic dynamic programming problem (see, e.g. Stokey et al., 1989) :
where the function v denotes the value of the agent's solution from the designated period forward and primes indicate the next period. The equilibrium solution can be derived in two related ways. One, because capital is fixed and therefore agents are unable to shift income over time, each period's decision problem, given the preceding realization of g and τ, is the same. Therefore, the determination of the going wage and rate of return on capital can be studied as though a representative agent were deciding how much of a continuous-valued N t to produce rather than making a discrete employment decision. Details are reserved for the Appendix.
Two, we can take advantage of the requirement that in equilibrium the utility of the employed and unemployed must be equal, otherwise those with less utility will migrate to the employment status of those with more. With each agent choosing between employment (n = n 0 ) and unemployment (n = 0) at the going wage and rental rate for capital, this requirement implies
, r = α , and ln(⋅) is strictly monotonic,
Although N reflects agents' individual employment decisions, it is implicitly defined by the parameter values in (7). If, for example, n 0 = 0.20, α = 0.40, ρ = 0.29, τ = 0.20, and g = 3.05, then N = 0.14. Hence if we now set λ = 1.02, then the first equation in (5) determines N/λn 0 , which gives the number and also the fraction of labor employed as 0.69 and the fraction unemployed as 0.31. Since total time available to the individual has been normalized to unity, n 0 has been calibrated as the average work week as a fraction of total time in a week (see King et al., 1988) . The production function determines α as capital's share of output and 1 -α as labor's share, which McGrattan (1994) calibrates as 0.60; ρ derives from Kydland (1995) ; and the value assigned to τ follows Baxter and King (1993) . In all, the central qualitative conclusion is that competitive equilibria for this economy are compatible with unemployment despite the homogeneity of the labor pool. Even though agents are economically identical, they divide in their equilibrium choices between employment and unemployment.
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This strongly impugns the common assumption that, within the constraints of a strictly political-economic model, identical material conditions imply identical social or political behavior and, conversely, that exogenous differences in wealth or income-producing ability are needed to explain differences in political behavior.
In the Appendix, I use equation 7 to derive the second main result that an increase in government spending increases output. Put intuitively, since leisure in equation 2 is a normal good (less is consumed when income decreases), more labor is produced as workers partially offset the net loss of private consumption caused by government spending. By a parallel argument, a relative decrease in spending reduces economic output. Neither outcome depends on the degree to which the spending party's victory was a surprise. Whatever the political circumstances of the partisan spending difference, then, the results of this section suggest that Democratic administrations will be associated with stronger economies than will Republican administrations. This last conclusion, as already noted, echoes Hibbs (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) . It is also consistent with findings from competitive equilibrium analyses incorporating fiscal policy (e.g. Aiyagari et al., 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Baxter and King, 1993; Burnside et al., 1993) .
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Enter Partisan Government: Stage Right or Stage Left?
The link between Democratic administrations and higher economic growth duplicates PT's and RPT's finding of a partisan business cycle. This link is also consistent with RPT's prediction of convergence in growth for the second half of each administration: the level change in output induced by partisan government represents a one-time change in both spending and economic growth over the life of the administration. As Gärtner (1994) observes, it is an arithmetic fact that second-half Democratic and Republican growth rates would likewise converge in 11. Indivisibilities in labor supply, of course, are not the only way to explain unemployment within this general framework (see, e.g., Lucas, 1981) . The modeling of partisanship developed later, moreover, assumes a much broader definition of the 'unemployed'. For that purpose, the calibration in the text overestimates n 0 and accordingly underestimates the unemployed fraction of the voting age population.
12. In addition the Solow residual (see footnote 8, p. 334), which affects growth, may partly reflect (be Granger caused by) a government spending component (Evans, 1992) .
RPT even if new labor contracts failed to incorporate the presidential election results.
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Although G is exogenous to each voter, voters have preferences between the specific realizations G D and G R . In the case just considered, which abstracts from insurance and the ideological reaction to spending φ, partisan preferences are uniformly pro-Republican. Higher spending has a negative impact on all workers, since the Democratic increase in employment is prompted by a net reduction in consumption. If employment is not attractive when wages and g are higher, then employment due to lower g cannot represent an improvement. As for the unemployed, it is true that not only does r increase with aggregate employment, but any redistributed tax proceeds from wages are generated by the employed alone. So from the standpoint of an unemployed individual, an increase in the number of employed taxpayers can more than compensate for the decline in the per capita tax paid out of the lower wage.
14 But net consumption must decrease since, otherwise, aggregate employment would not increase; and in equilibrium the marginal utilities of the employed and unemployed are equal.
In short, in the absence of insurance the Republican party, which is associated with lower G, would be preferred by everyone if government's impact on private consumption were the voter's only consideration, that is, to the extent φ(G) was not a competing factor. This is the counterpart in the present model to Alesina and Rosenthal's (1995: 225-7) empirical finding of a clear bias toward Republicans in the presidential electorate. 13 . Since the present model incorporates trend growth in labor productivity, it seems to accommodate the response of Alesina et al. (1997: 166) to the claim by Gärtner (1994) cited in the text. Hibbs et al. (1997) and Alesina et al. (1997) , for their part, confirm a statistical relation between economic performance and electoral surprises. It is worth emphasizing, therefore, that while the model in the text does not attribute this partisan difference to uncertainty, partisan surprises can represent fiscal as well as monetary innovations. And, if one surrenders the simplification of no saving, the impact of fiscal innovations on a dynamic competitive equilibrium economy parallels the impact of monetary surprises on RPT's sticky-price economy. To characterize this fiscal impact informally, a predicted Democratic victory will increase current employment in anticipation of lower consumption and a lower wage. To the extent agents are surprised by a Democratic victory, then, they will not engage in such intertemporal substitution and thus will react to Democratic economic policies more strongly than otherwise. Similarly, since anticipated Republican administrations provoke intertemporal substitution in the opposite direction, surprise Republican victories reduce employment and therefore output. Incidentally, for neither of the two estimates of surprise used by Hibbs et al. (1997) is the predicted vote explicitly connected to the underlying political-economic model. Moreover, while Carlsen and Pedersen (1999) find support for RPT in their study of the UK and, to some extent, Canada and Australia, for the US the results are dominated by a simple post-election dummy variable, which better fits the present model. Finally, simple convergence need not obtain if there were productivity shocks correlated with government spending (see footnote 12, p. 337), although a lagged impact might confound the resulting partisan effect.
14. When a fixed proportion τ* of tax revenues is redistributed, the impact of additional wage earners on the unemployed is determined by τ*n 0 ∂(wN)/∂G = τ*n 0 [w(∂N/∂G) + N(∂w/∂G)] = τ*n 0 w∂N/∂G[1 -(N/w)dw/dN] = τ*n 0 w(∂N/∂G)(1 -η), where η is the elasticity of wages with respect to employment.
Of course, the seemingly counterintuitive conclusion that the reduction in labor supply Republicans produce can be a political boon to them is not equivalent to suggesting that measured unemployment is a political asset to the party in power. Ideally, official unemployment reflects the experience of those who desire but do not have work. The decrease in employment described here, by contrast, reflects more 'voluntary' reductions in labor supply. These include, for example, the decision to stay home with children, wait for a better offer, or retire early. Thus according to this model a reduction in employment due to increased college enrollment would not represent a political liability for Republicans.
To get a fuller and more balanced picture of how preferences develop endogenously, it is necessary to consider the role of unemployment insurance in allowing a more efficient allocation of the political-economic risk individuals face. In the economies explored by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) , workers each period negotiate an employment contract with the firm. It determines each individual's probability of working and not working, but with unemployment completely insured by the firm or through access to an insurance market. For our purposes, there is one central difficulty with this approach. The crucial assumption of complete insurance is implausible. Since private insurance faces a serious problem of moral hazard (e.g. Hansen, 1985: 326) , insurance markets are incomplete. Indeed government-supplied unemployment insurance now covers over 90 percent of the US work-force (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992: 118-9) . 15 By the same token, government insurance is also incomplete. The OECD, for example, estimates the average replacement ratio for after-tax wages in the US during the period 1991-95 as 14 percent (OECD, 1994: 199) , although other estimates (for other periods) are substantially higher (e.g. Clark and Summers, 1982) .
Prior to an election, individuals face a publicly observable and exogenous political lottery whose realization dictates higher or lower rational employment responses. Workers with unemployment coverage are partly insured against this ex ante uncertainty concerning the resulting level of consumption. As noted earlier, however, eligibility is conditioned on the agent's initial status. This restriction will be modeled in the following manner. Prior to each election, workers can agree to a one-period contract stipulating that employees obtain lower consumption than they would otherwise enjoy (the original equilibrium consumption of the employed minus the insurance premium) in return for enhanced consumption in the event of unemployment (the original equilibrium consumption of the unemployed plus insurance). The firm, in turn, dictates the employment level within the limits of its experience rating, that is, so long as the competitive 15. Wright (1986) does show that public insurance systems can arise even when full private insurance is available, but his model abstracts from the moral hazard problem and treats the probability of unemployment as idiosyncratic and exogenous to the political-economic system. The present model could, of course, be supplemented with a private shock to consumption with a parallel impact on partisan preference. employment level is reproduced. Consumption by the employed under the contract is thus net of the cost of insurance which they bear equally. 16 Net increases in employment, of course, do not necessarily preserve the status of those currently employed, nor do net decreases in employment necessarily preserve the status of those currently unemployed. These, nevertheless, are plausible assumptions. Given even very small transactions or search costs in labor markets, otherwise identical individuals will experience a different likelihood of employment conditional on their current employment status. In 'booms' the unemployed will be the ones who tend to change their status, whereas in 'busts' the employed will be the ones who tend to change theirs. To adopt the simplest version of this assumption, the employed and unemployed do not replace one another. Although all those under contract receive unemployment insurance if they become unemployed during the contract period, with these restrictions only those previously unemployed are, in fact, subject to unemployment that period. The contract signed prior to the election thus provides a job from which these agents may be fired and thereby become eligible for insurance.
Let N Dt and N Rt be the proportion of the work-force at time t that would be employed under Democratic and Republican administrations respectively. Given our assumptions about Republican and Democratic policies, p EDt ≡ (N Dt -N Rt )/ (1 -N Rt ) is the probability that an unemployed individual will change status when a Democratic administration is elected and 1 -p EDt = (1 -N Dt )/(1 -N Rt ) is the probability that an unemployed individual will remain so. Since employment does not change when a Republican is elected, the group N Rt , which, borrowing Lenin's term might be called a labor aristocracy, has nothing to gain from a lottery contract, which would simply lower its net consumption.
The potential contract involves agents who take as exogenous both the amount of insurance and the electoral lottery. The issues facing them are: (1) whether there is a feasible contract that dominates no contract; and, if so, (2) whether, given such a contract, their expected utility is higher under a Democratic or Republican president. In the Appendix it is shown that: (1) there is a feasible contract; and (2) those more likely to be unemployed are more likely to vote for the Democrats, those less likely to be unemployed are more likely to vote Republican. Due to the positive trend in government spending, however, an increasing proportion of workers will tend to be immune to unemployment (a result attenuated by population growth, which is not modeled here). Increased employment produces a more politically conservative electorate, a result that, ironically, is due to Democratic policies.
In fact, as the Appendix makes clear, when there is complete insurance from both parties, which means the employed and unemployed enjoy the same con-16. Since by assumption employment status in one period does not dictate eligibility in others, fundamental complications in solving the agent's decision problem are once again avoided. Given legal restrictions on the duration of insurance eligibility, this analytic convenience is a reasonable approximation to reality. sumption, those who do not have to work are better off. In this case, all agents prefer the Republicans in terms of consumption and leisure. The Democrats are thus vulnerable to Republican increases in unemployment insurance, a version of 'compassionate conservatism'. Another direct judgement from the formal analysis is that the greater the relative value placed on leisure, the more likely are Republicans to get votes. Indeed, as one would suspect from the fact that leisure and consumption are normal goods, the greater the chance of being employed, the more significant for the Democrats is the resulting loss of leisure.
More generally, suppose that the larger the expected utility differential between candidates, the less likely a voter is to abstain (operationalized as a rightward shift in Z in footnote 9, p. 334). If so, it is natural to ask how the Democrats' pursuit of their ideological preferences affects their electoral prospects. From a comparative statics perspective, they can pursue these preferences by increasing insurance or by increasing p ED , which occurs through spending via
Since members of N R consume more than individuals under contract and ln′′(x) < 0, spending increases have a greater impact on the contract group than on the N R Republicans. By the same token, the political value of these two changes for potential Democratic supporters cannot be assessed independently. I show in the Appendix that Democrats have an incentive to provide complete insurance. This means that insured workers have contracted away all risk remaining after a Democratic victory. By the same token, I also show that unless the purely 'ideological' response to spending -the φ term -is sufficiently large, purely economic considerations place limits on the ideological agenda of the Left. With more spending Democrats ultimately lose support from their 'natural' constituency.
The bottom line is that while insurance is a positive Democratic issue, spending to the point of full employment tends to hurt their political chances, generating the counterpart of Reagan Democrats. When the Democratic candidate is too 'left-wing', the party's natural economic base is alienated. Conversely, it is obvious from equation (A7) in the Appendix that if leisure is valued highly enough, the Democrats are politically rewarded by lower spending, that is, only by acting more like Republicans. Of course, judging by official measures of unemployment, it might seem that a class-based Democratic party has little hope in any case. Again, it is important to recognize that the Democrats' potential 1 -N R share of the model vote includes many who are not officially unemployed. These voters should also be kept in mind when evaluating the reasonableness of the assumption that individuals are not simply made unemployed but make leisureconsumption choices. 17. Haveman (1996: 37) , for example, concludes that 'changes in work patterns that to a large extent reflect voluntary choices may account for a sizable share of the increase in earnings inequality'. Keep in mind as well that transfers to the unemployed broadly defined include transfers to college students and social security. By contrast, for a competitive equilibrium approach to the Great Depression, a huge unselective reduction in employment, see Prescott (1999) .
To sum up, indivisibilities in the supply of labor generate two classes of voters, the employed and the unemployed. Elections 'mix' these discrete states by creating non-degenerate probabilities of employment and unemployment, supplemented by insurance payments. The result is new consumption possibilities and variations in partisan preference. This does not mean that the political uncertainty created by ideological variation in φ i causes class-based partisan differences. 18 Rather, it alters the conditions under which economic differences influence political preference. Voters who expect to be employed tend to favor the Republicans, those exposed to unemployment offer an opportunity for Democrats. In particular, if Democrats sufficiently limit their spending increases and complement them with welfare payments, they can garner the support of voters facing the prospect of unemployment.
By the same token, these results suggest that the common political-economic assumption that divergent political behavior must be rooted in material differences is far too simplistic: here, unemployment and partisan differences emerge in an economically homogeneous population. Without questioning the role of cross-cutting cleavages in weakening the impact of class (cf. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989; Roemer, 1998) , we see that diversity can arise in response to the political-economic context in which individuals choose.
Concluding Remarks
During the 20th century, Democratic administrations have been associated with greater economic growth and lower levels of unemployment than their Republican counterparts. The political consequence for the parties is that those individuals more likely to be unemployed are more likely to support the Democrats. Yet while such partisan differences in economic performance and class influences on voting are well documented, the mechanism linking these regularities is much less clear than intuition might suggest. PT's Keynesian explanation of political influences on employment presupposes workers who make irrational employment decisions. RPT accounts for the difference in partisan economic performance without assuming this kind of political manipulation. But the economic mechanism remains irrational, while class-based partisanship is not explained.
In contrast to PT, in this paper consistently rational behavior by workers and voters accounts for the difference in party economic performance, class-based partisanship, and the link between them. Aside from the derived difference in economic performance, the results in this paper also contrast with RPT's. According to RPT, exogenous contracts fix nominal wages and are the propagation mechanism for government influences on the economy. In the present model, 18. Nor does this preclude more direct exogenous shocks to consumption from playing an analogous role in a revised model (see footnote 15, p. 339).
contracts fix real wages and are rational adaptations to the economic impact of partisan policy differences. According to RPT, policy matters because, in effect, contracts ignore electoral uncertainties. In the present model, contracts matter because they exploit electoral uncertainties. Finally, in RPT the political preferences of the electorate are exogenous. In the present model they are influenced, as with PT, by individual employment prospects. But the electorate is fully rational and operates in a competitive economy. This paper, then, offers a potential explanation for the association between Democratic administrations and (1) higher growth and lower unemployment, and (2) a greater likelihood of support from those most likely to be unemployed. Yet it shows that this 'natural' constituency will switch parties if the Democrats propose extreme 'tax and spend' policies. We thus see why many blue-collar workers may have voted Republican in the 1980s notwithstanding their individually declining economic position (Nagler and De Boef, 1999 ). The present model suggests more generally that these workers are the ones more likely to make partisan changes (Weatherford, 1978) . It also suggests that Republican efforts to protect insurance entitlements like Social Security would increase their political support from this group by reducing the policy difference over insurance on which they are most vulnerable and increasing the salience of policies affecting after-tax consumption on which they are strongest. Conversely, the model suggests that welfare reform or other policies that make insurance less of an entitlement would increase the dependence of swing voters on specific Democratic administrations in the future: while the fight for entitlements helps Democrats, the institutionalization of entitlements hurts them. In this vein, the model rationalizes the New Democratic 'Third Way', that is, the move toward welfare reform and relative spending restrictions.
Finally, examination of equations (A5) and (A6) from the Appendix shows that both the feasibility of the labor contract and the partisan preferences of those covered by it are determined by the additional unemployment insurance Democrats offer, the probability such insurance will be needed, and relative consumption under the two parties. If unemployment is unexpectedly high due to lower than anticipated spending by either party, then the higher insurance premium needed to support a larger group of unemployed can prompt a conservative backlash from employed swing voters against the welfare policies providing for the unemployed. The 1990s, however, witnessed a different pattern, a combination of sustained increases in employment associated with robust economic growth, increased government spending measured by share of GDP, yet, if anything, surprise disinflation over the same period. The present model, in contrast to Alesina's, is consistent with this pattern and the concomitant working-class support for a Democratic president.
By focusing on fiscal policy's impact on economic growth, however, this model leaves an important gap: money and, accordingly, monetary policy play no role. Although the empirical advantage of a monetary model over the alternative is not always clear (e.g. Sims, 1992) and even though McGrattan (1994: 574) finds that 'a significant proportion of the variance of the aggregate consumption, output, [and] hours worked…can be explained by the government expenditures and factor tax processes', it is heroic to ignore monetary policy. By the same token, I have used fiscal policy to account for the typical difference in economic output between Democratic and Republican administrations. The model is not designed to explain the business cycle as a whole. Another important limitation is that, like Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Hibbs (1987) , the present model largely treats the policies of the two political parties as exogenous. The complications attending models of ideological parties operating strategically in one or two dimensions (e.g. spending and insurance) are quite substantial (see Roemer, 1998) .
Endogenizing party preferences is particularly intriguing given the present finding that the system of class-based partisan preferences can collapse when the party of growth becomes either too extreme or insufficiently distinct. This collapse also depends on the homogeneity imposed on the model's agents. Clearly, individual variations in the amount of capital, human and otherwise, and in levels of productivity, to name but a few factors, would generate greater political diversity. Still, the present model provides a benchmark for assessing whether these variations are important forces behind the economics of voting.
To express the point more methodologically, in this paper the economic behavior of agents is explained by the opportunities available to them and their preferences over the fundamental goods of consumption and leisure. The formalism of the model notwithstanding, it tries to understand the impact of economic policies and the political reactions they provoke in terms of individual attempts to grapple with economic circumstances in light of electoral outcomes. In less stringently 'structural' models, by contrast, the rules governing agents' behavior will not be invariant to changes in partisan policy, so that determining the implications of these changes becomes inherently problematic (see Lucas, 1976; more specifically, see, e.g. Jackman, 1989; Hicks and Patterson, 1989) . Put another way, it may be that the general failure by students of the working class to anticipate how changes in policy, particularly welfare policy, would affect its politics has a deeper significance. It reflects the already noted absence of clear microfoundations in traditional analyses of economic voting. Inferences derived from structural models are less dependent on particular historical samples or imputed class interests and therefore, in the long run, are more likely to generate robust predictions.
APPENDIX
The dynamic programming problem (equation 6) can be connected to the equilibrium solution found via equation (7) by constructing an artificial representative agent who pro-vides continuous amounts of labor n*, 0 ≤ n* ≤ n 0 , since n 0 is aggregate labor supply when the entire population works. The intuition supporting this construction is that while actual workers can only supply the discrete amount of labor n 0 , their individual decisions to work or not constitute marginal adjustments to the aggregate (for vividness, one can imagine resetting n 0 to unity after rescaling total time to 1/n 0 ). We wish to solve
subject to (3), (4), and 0 ≤ n* = N* ≤ n 0 , with (5) the resulting market-clearing condition. Define f(n t *) ≡ (1 -τ t )F(1, N t ). Since λ, g, and τ have finite upper bounds, the following is true:
(i) f(n t *) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave (since
Then one can rely on the fact that a strictly concave function defined over a compact domain has a unique maximum. With these facts in hand, and noting that as the sum of concave functions u(c t , 1 -n t ) is concave, it is legitimate to take the first-order and envelope conditions for (6):
Advancing (A2) one period, that is, applying the operator L -1 to both sides, where L k x t = x t -k , taking expectations, and substituting out EV n′ (c′, n*′, g′, λ′, τ′) yields a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal labor supply: which says that each period the after-tax wage relative to consumption equals the weight placed on leisure relative to the amount of leisure. Solving for n* determines the equilibrium aggregate labor supply facing the actual model agent who chooses between employment and unemployment, since when this condition is satisfied, (7) in the main text is also satisfied.
Finally, although there is a competitive equilibrium for a non-convex labor economy in general (e.g. Rogerson, 1988) , the presence of a proportional tax complicates the existence proof. I follow Baxter and King (1993) in treating τ as a flat tax on gross output. That is, since rent is equal to the marginal product of capital and wages are equal to the marginal product of labor, then by (3), (4), and Euler's Theorem, Given an economy with production function F*(K, N) = F* (1, N) , the first-order condition for labor supply is the one just calculated.
The economic impact of aggregate government spending can be assessed by writing the condition for equilibrium (7) as I now use this relation to show that increases in government spending increase output. Since N is continuous, the response of effective labor supply to changes in government spending is ∂N/∂G. To derive this response, first note that (A3) and (A4)
With respect to (A3), because < 1, ∂L/∂G > 0 when increases in spending are financed exclusively by deficits or lump-sum taxes (i.e. when dτ/dG = 0). The situation is a little more complicated when tax rates increase to help cover increased government spending (i.e. when dτ/dG > 0). An increase in the tax rate has both an income effect -the pressure on individuals to work in order to offset the reduction in their after-tax incomeand an opposite substitution effect -the pressure on individuals to decrease work, which has become less rewarding. Thus when taxes increase, the sign of ∂L/∂G is ambiguous. Since [(dτ/dG)α -dg/dG][1 -] > 0, the sign primarily depends on the relative magnitude of (dτ/dG)n 0 (1 -α) . For the post-Second World War period McGrattan's (1994: 589) analysis indicates that government consumption has had opposite and largely offsetting effects on labor and capital tax rates. Accordingly, I assume that changes in government spending are not funded by changes in the tax rate.
With respect to (A4), I only consider N > 0, which is guaranteed by the production and utility functions. The first two terms enclosed in brackets are negative. To evaluate the third term, note that if ∂g/∂N ≥ 0, then ∂L/∂N < 0 and therefore, by an argument paralleling the use of the Implicit Function Theorem below, ∂N/∂G > 0, which via the relation ∂N/∂G = (∂N/∂g)(dg/dG), and the fact that a derivative and its reciprocal have identical signs, implies ∂g/∂N < 0, which is a contradiction. So it must be that ∂g/∂N < 0, which makes the third term positive. Suppose that as a result ∂L/∂N > 0. Then by the preceding logic ∂N/∂G < 0, which implies the contradiction that ∂g/∂N > 0. Therefore, ∂g/∂N, ∂L/∂N < 0.
Given the signs of (A3) and (A4) the Implicit Function Theorem implies that By (3), ∂F/∂N > 0, that is, government spending increases output. I now show (i) the feasibility of a labor contract, and (ii) the conditions under which it leads to greater support for Democrats from those more likely to be unemployed and greater support for Republicans from those less likely to be unemployed. Although agents where p D is the probability of a Democratic victory and p UR = 1 -p D . In other words, conditional on membership in the group 1 -N R , p E = p D p ED is the pre-election probability of being employed after the election, p UD = p D (1 -p ED ) is the pre-election probability of being unemployed under a Democrat after the election, and p UR is the pre-election probability of being unemployed under a Republican after the election. by a generalization of Jensen's inequality for conditional probabilities (e.g. Chung, 1974: 302) . In short, (A5) can be satisfied. If it is, the swing-pool of labor strictly prefers the contract to the noncontract economy. When condition (A5) obtains, only the group 1 -N R is under a contract allowing access to unemployment insurance. With regard to (ii), which relates to partisan preference, satisfaction of (A5) is a necessary condition for Democrats to be preferred by members of 1 -N R . In the event of a contract, i will prefer the Democrat so long as Democrats have an incentive to provide insurance. Indeed for all p ED , substitution and algebraic manipulation show that the politically optimal insurance is always complete: c UD + I = c EC .
With regard to spending, we can now determine whether optimal p ED = 1 by assuming complete insurance from Democrats, which simplifies the left-hand side of (A8) to (A9) Up to the point p ED = 1, the second term of (A9) is negative but the sign of the first term is ambiguous. 19 At p ED = 1, however, the employed pay nothing for insurance since none is needed, so in terms of consumption and leisure, (A6) reduces to lnc E + ρln(1 -n 0 ) > lnc UR . Abstracting from φ i , this inequality cannot obtain in equilibrium since ρln(1 -n 0 ) < 0 and, as we have seen, it is the lower consumption associated with increased spending G D that increases employment to p ED = 1. Democrats, in short, cannot be optimizing at p ED = 1 unless φ′′(G) is numerically small enough.
